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GENE PARK
The Politics of Budgeting in Japan
How Much Do Institutions Matter?
ABSTRACT
In the past decade, the Japanese government has revamped its budget institutions 
twice. This paper examines how these changes have changed the configuration of 
power among the actors in the budget process. It also explores the implications of 
these changes for the management of the nation’s finances.
KEYWORDS:  Japanese politics, budget politics, fiscal policy, budget institutions, 
public spending
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the Japanese government has undertaken two systematic 
efforts to reform its budget institutions and budget process. First, in 2001, 
the government established a new body, the Council on Economic and Fis-
cal Policy (CEFP), charged with overseeing budget and economic policy. 
With the historic victory by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, 
the new government immediately set to work overhauling the budget process 
for the coming fiscal year (FY), creating two new budget institutions. These 
efforts to reform Japan’s budget process have implications both for how the 
government manages its finances and the nature of political control over 
budget making. This paper asks: What impact has Japan’s budget reform 
had, if any, and what impact is it likely to have in the future? 
WHY BUDGET INSTITUTIONS MATTER
The issue of Japan’s budget institutions is one of both real-world and theo-
retical significance. Since 1991, the budget has been in deficit every FY, and 
Gene Park is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Baruch College, City University of New 
York. The author would like to thank Myung-koo Kang, Bill Grimes, Kay Shimizu, and Masayuki 
Takahashi for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Email: <gene.park@baruch.cuny.edu>.
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the nation now faces net public debt of over 100% of gross domestic product 
(GDP). This figure will rise considerably as a consequence of the global fi-
nancial crisis that began in 2008. These deficits and high public debt are 
daunting national political challenges that threaten Japan’s future economic 
prosperity. Servicing its public debt consumes a growing share of its limited 
budgetary resources and will leave a large fiscal burden for future generations 
to bear. For 2010 (FY), bond issuances will total a staggering 48% of the 
budget, exceeding tax revenues for the first time in Japan’s postwar history. 
As the country’s population ages, social security expenditures continue to rise 
while the base of workers paying taxes and social insurance declines. The 
government has been helped by low interest rates, but this is unlikely to 
continue indefinitely. 
As research has shown, budget deficits are a problem rooted in the nature 
of the costs and benefits of public spending. Budget deficits can arise as a 
result of the rational calculations of political actors.1 Because tax revenues are 
a common resource, the problem of a “common pool” arises. The benefits 
accruing from the use of tax revenue are typically highly concentrated, e.g., 
targeted toward a specific region or group, while the costs of higher budget 
deficits are widely dispersed, i.e., paid for by a common pool tax base. This 
produces a systematic bias toward budget deficits because there is an asym-
metry between the benefits and costs, with some groups or regions capturing 
benefits while bearing only a fraction of the cost. Research on this problem 
has demonstrated, however, that a variety of factors, such as strong budget 
institutions that force actors to internalize the costs of budget deficits, can 
alleviate the common pool problem.2 As von Hagen and Hallerberg argue, 
when a government delegates authority to a centralized budget apparatus, it 
will have an incentive to mitigate budget deficits, as this will be one of the 
criteria by which its success will be measured.3 Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery 
have reached a similar conclusion based on their empirical analysis showing 
that stronger fiscal bureaucracies produce lower fiscal deficits.4 Budget insti-
tutions matter because they shape fiscal performance.
1. James M. Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen, “Introduction,” in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Perfor-
mance, James M. Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen, eds. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
2. Ibid.
3. Jurgen von Hagen and Mark Hallerberg, “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and
Budget Deficits within the European Union,” in ibid., Poterba and von Hagen, eds., pp. 214–15.
4. Sung Deuk Hahm, Mark S. Kamlet, and David Mowery, “The Political Economy of Deficit
Spending in Nine Industrialized Parliamentary Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies 29:1 (1996).
AS5005_07_Park.indd   966 10/19/10   10:29 AM
PARK /  JAPAN BUDGET REFORM • 967
Budget institutions also matter because they structure the relative influ-
ence of various actors over the budget process. This has been an issue of keen 
interest in Japan, because the movement to reform the country’s budget in-
stitutions has been largely motivated by the goal of increasing the role of the 
executive in the budget process. Strengthening budget institutions, along 
with other administrative reforms, would remove the ills of disconnected, 
bottom-up policy making (tatewari gyōsei), an overly powerful bureaucracy, 
and political interference from party backbenchers. This was true of the Lib-
eral Democratic Party’s (LDP) creation of the CEFP, and even more so for 
the DPJ’s current reform. The extent to which the CEFP strengthened the 
cabinet has been debated among Japan scholars. Some have found that the 
CEFP has in fact tipped the balance of power from party backbenchers and 
the bureaucracy in favor of the prime minister and cabinet.5 Mulgan, how-
ever, has argued that the CEFP has not fundamentally changed the balance 
of power.6 This study will not definitively settle this debate, but the issue of 
budgeting is particularly germane to the discussion because greater budget 
control has been a central goal of reforms to enhance political leadership.
THE BUDGET PROCESS PRIOR TO 2001
As in all countries, the budget process has several layers of budget decisions. 
First, governments must determine the overall budget size, level of deficit 
financing, and overall fiscal stance. Second, governments make decisions 
regarding the allocation of funds to broad areas such as defense or social se-
curity. Finally, there are thousands of micro-level decisions regarding the 
funding of specific policies and projects.7 In the Japanese context, prior to 
2001 this process typically proceeded from June until March of the following 
year (Japan’s FY runs from April 1 to the subsequent end of March). Figure 1 
illustrates the key steps in the process. The old budget process began in June 
with a determination of the overall size of the budget. After considering a 
number of factors, such as the state of the economy, projected revenues, debt 
5. Mitsuo Hosen, “Acceleration of Economic Reform in Japan and the Role of the Council on
Economic and Fiscal Policy,” in Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Performance in East Asia 
(Manila: East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
6. Aurelia George Mulgan, Japan’s Failed Revolution: Koizumi and the Politics of Economic Reform
(Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2002), pp. 213–31.
7. The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this framework for
analyzing the budget process.
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levels, and so forth, the government issued the budget request guideline, 
sometimes referred to as the budget ceiling, which sets a numerical target for 
the coming FY that was not to be exceeded. The purpose of the budget re-
quest guideline was to provide a baseline for ministries to use in compiling 
their formal budget requests for the coming FY. 
The setting of the budget guideline was one of the most important stages 
in budget negotiations because it determined how large the pie would be. 
During the 1990s, the budget guideline also indicated at least very roughly 
the government’s priorities, specifying funding levels for certain sectors such 
as social security and public works. Under normal circumstances, the gov-
ernment typically adhered to the budget guideline, although it was not bind-
ing. In later stages of budget negotiations, the government could revise target 
budget totals depending on a variety of factors such as macroeconomic con-
ditions or other pressing needs. If a severe economic downturn occurred, for 
instance, the government might increase the budget total in order to stimu-
late the economy or, as happened during the first Gulf War, the government 
increased spending to finance the war effort.
The MOF compiled the budget request guideline, but it was the product 
of intense political negotiation. Typically, backbenchers from the longtime 
ruling LDP and the spending ministries (i.e., all those other than the MOF) 
attempted to increase their allocations. LDP politicians were particularly 
Budget process starts
Budget request guideline
Ministry of Finance (MOF) budget









Spending ministry budget requests August
source: By author.
figure 1. The Old Budget Process
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interested in increasing spending in areas that would help them channel sup-
port to their constituents (e.g., public works) or for other policies in which 
they had a particular interest. The spending ministries maneuvered to raise 
their totals or avoid cuts. Zoku (politicians with specific policy expertise) 
Diet members and spending ministries often collaborated. Zoku interceded 
on behalf of spending ministries, and the latter responded to requests from 
zoku. During these negotiations, MOF, which consistently advocated fiscal 
discipline, attempted to keep the budget request guideline as low as possible. 
But the ministry was constrained by the need to secure the approval of the 
LDP, the prime minister, and the cabinet. MOF was in constant communi-
cation with all of these groups throughout the entire budget process, at-
tempting to gauge what was politically feasible.8 The ruling party and 
government signaled to MOF its priorities through these channels of com-
munication, but these interactions also provided an opportunity for MOF 
to convince the political leadership of the need to limit spending. The bulk 
of the negotiations occurred through these informal, behind-the-scenes 
channels, but in cases where there was persistent disagreement, the govern-
ment and LDP leadership brokered settlements.
Both the government—the prime minister and cabinet—and the ruling 
party played active roles in the budget process. Formally, the prime minister 
and cabinet approved the budget request guidelines and submitted a budget 
bill to the Diet, but behind the scenes, the LDP participated in the budget 
process. Whether the ruling party or the government was the ultimate arbi-
ter is difficult to determine. Mulgan argues that the LDP, not the govern-
ment, called the shots, a situation that she dubs an “un-Westminster 
system.”9 There is some degree of truth to this in the case of the budget pro-
cess, but it is also true that some prime ministers were able to override inter-
nal party opposition, as in the 1980s, when Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro imposed zero-growth budget ceilings.
The budget request guideline served as the basis for formal budget re-
quests made by spending ministries. At this point, budget negotiations were 
largely over the distribution of the total amount of funds: it was understood 
that the requests would not exceed the budget request guideline, barring 
some kind of significant change in circumstances (e.g., onset of a recession). 
8. Maurice Wright, Japan’s Fiscal Crisis: The Ministry of Finance and the Politics of Public Spend-
ing, 1975–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 275–311.
9. Mulgan, Japan’s Failed Revolution.
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Spending ministry bureaucrats, zoku Diet members, and MOF were the key 
actors that determined the composition of the spending within this guide-
line at the micro level. The process was largely bottom-up. Spending minis-
try bureaucrats took the lead role, and in some cases bureaucrats cooperated 
with the zoku Diet members, who interceded to win funding for public 
works projects or other policy areas they deemed important. MOF, specifi-
cally its budget examiners, reviewed specific spending requests, attempting 
to cut unnecessary spending in order to keep requests as low as possible. The 
allocation for public works and public investment was particularly conten-
tious because both were important to LDP politicians who wanted to deliver 
concrete goods to their constituents. In rare cases when disputes could not 
be reconciled, the issue moved up the hierarchy, advancing to the deputy 
director of the Budget Bureau. Only occasionally did an issue reach the ad-
ministrative vice minister, the highest civil service position in MOF, and 
even less frequently the minister of finance. The party leadership and govern-
ment intervened to settle only the most intractable disputes.10
After the spending ministries and MOF agreed on their spending requests, 
MOF compiled a draft, the so-called “MOF budget.” From this stage for-
ward, most of the big political issues had already been settled through prior 
negotiation (some exceptions are discussed below), although zoku Diet mem-
bers and spending ministries did attempt to make minor changes such as re-
storing funding for specific projects. After completion of the MOF budget, a 
final round, the “revival negotiations,” opened, allowing for minor changes. 
This final stage was partly political theater, because the amount of funds set 
aside by MOF for these negotiations was already determined and known by 
all the key parties. During these negotiations, concessions were made in Ja-
pan’s so-called “second budget,” the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP).11
The final changes were then incorporated into a cabinet budget plan. The 
cabinet voted on the official budget plan, which at this point was largely a 
formality. The budget bill was then submitted to the House of Representa-
tives, the lower house, for deliberation and a vote. The House of Councilors, 
the upper chamber of the Diet, also considers the budget, although its role 
is inferior to that of the House of Representatives. In cases where there is 
disagreement between the two houses that cannot be resolved, or if the 
10. Author interview with MOF official, Tokyo, June 27, 2008.
11. Gene Park, Spending without Taxation: FILP and the Politics of Public Finance in Japan (Palo
Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2011).
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upper house has not acted within 30 days after receipt of the budget passed 
by the House of Representatives, the latter’s decision stands, as stipulated in 
Article 60 of the Constitution. In practice, though, with a few exceptions the 
passage through both houses was largely a formality because the political 
negotiations within the ruling party or coalition had already occurred.
In addition to the initial government budget described above, there were 
two other important sources of public spending: supplementary budgets and 
the FILP Plan. The supplementary budget was a mid-year adjustment: the 
government might have passed a supplementary budget because of changes 
during the relevant FY. For instance, economic growth might have produced 
more revenue than expected, pressures from the U.S. government to stimu-
late domestic demand might have increased, or a recession might have indi-
cated the use of fiscal stimulus. In some cases, the supplementary budget also 
became an extension of the political negotiations over the initial budget. If 
funding could not be found for certain programs or policies during the ini-
tial budget negotiations, deals were sometimes cut with the understanding 
that the government would pass a mid-year supplementary budget to provide 
funds for them.12 Whatever the motivation, supplementary budgets became 
very common and a significant source of budget indiscipline. 
FILP was, and still is, a system for mobilizing savings for government-
directed loans and investments that serve a public policy function. The gov-
ernment used FILP to pay for a significant portion of its public works and 
also to provide subsidized loans for housing, small and medium enterprise, 
and other users. Every year the government drew up a FILP Plan, which 
specified the overall level of funding for the coming FY and the specific al-
location levels to the public and quasi-public bodies that invest or lend the 
funds. The process of drawing up the FILP Plan ran parallel to that of the 
formal budget. During budget negotiations, the FILP Plan served as a tool 
to broker compromises. Since FILP did not draw on limited tax revenues, 
MOF often preferred that spending ministries use FILP funds.13
THE CEFP
In early 2001, with the establishment of the CEFP, a new player was added 
to the budget process. The CEFP was housed within a new cabinet office 
12. Author interview with MOF official, Tokyo, June 24, 2008.
13. Park, Spending without Taxation.
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intended to set and coordinate the direction of policy. The creation of the 
CEFP and more specifically the attempt to give the cabinet a larger role in 
fiscal policy were the culmination of a number of political currents. Propos-
als to transfer budget authority from MOF to the cabinet surfaced numerous 
times throughout the postwar period. Specifically, some argued that the 
Budget Bureau of MOF should be moved to the cabinet, giving the execu-
tive the capacity to draft the budget. MOF vigorously opposed such an idea. 
Within MOF, the Budget Bureau has been the most powerful bureau, and 
budgeting its most valued function. Given MOF’s perceived success in man-
aging the economy and its extensive networks within the LDP,14 the ministry 
was able to thwart such reform plans, at least until the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, the political situation of MOF changed dramatically, as 
Grimes, Amyx, and others have recounted.15 First, MOF’s reputation as an 
effective steward of economic policy came into question. As Japan’s eco-
nomic bubble collapsed and the economy entered a period of prolonged 
stagnation and financial crisis, MOF bore much of the blame, in some cases 
justifiably and in others not, for Japan’s weak economy. Second, a steady 
stream of misdeeds and corruption by MOF officials provoked a public 
backlash against the ministry. Third, LDP support for MOF decreased. 
Bashing bureaucrats became an effective and popular electoral strategy, for 
the opposition as well as the LDP. MOF’s easy cooperation with the first 
coalition government that excluded the LDP, from 1993 to 1994, also pro-
duced a resentment of the ministry within the party.16 
All of these factors made MOF an obvious political target as Hashimoto 
Ryūtarō’s administration embarked upon an ambitious reform to reorganize 
the bureaucracy and change the policymaking process. As the reform agenda 
advanced, MOF faced the threat of a full dismemberment. Various proposals 
suggested removing banking and securities regulation from MOF control—
as well as its budgeting function. In the end, MOF suffered a severe defeat. 
The government transferred banking and securities regulation to two newly 
created entities. A revision to the Bank of Japan Law, which gave the central 
14. Jennifer A. Amyx, Japan’s Financial Crisis, Institutional Rigidity, and Reluctant Change (Prince-
ton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 49–55.
15. Ibid.; and William W. Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle: Macroeconomic Politics, 1985–
2000 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001).
16. Masaru Mabuchi, Ōkūrashō Wa Naze Oitsumerareta No Ka: Seikan Kankei No Henbō [Why is
the Ministry of Finance always under attack? The transformation of political-bureaucratic relations] 
(Tokyo: Chūo Kōronsha, 1997). 
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bank greater autonomy, also reduced MOF influence over monetary policy. 
The only silver lining for MOF was that it managed to preserve its budgetary 
function.17 As part of Hashimoto’s Central Ministries and Agencies Reform 
Basic Law, the law that established the newly restructured MOF in fact reit-
erated the ministry’s responsibility for planning, drafting, and executing the 
budget (Article 4).18
Although MOF kept the Budget Bureau intact, the political struggle over 
the budget was not finished. In order to strengthen the executive with more 
power and resources, the government created a new Cabinet Secretariat and 
a new Cabinet Office. As part of this reform, the government passed the 
Cabinet Office Establishment Law in 1999, which provided for creation of 
the CEFP within the Cabinet Office. In the lead-up to passage, MOF at-
tempted to weaken the new body’s role in the budget process, even seeking 
to eliminate “fiscal” from its name.19
The CEFP and the Budget Process
The CEFP was charged with drafting the basic policy direction for manage-
ment of the whole economy, including fiscal policy and budget formula-
tion.20 The prime minister headed the CEFP, which indeed became part of 
the Cabinet Office. Other members included the chief cabinet secretary, 
minister of Finance, minister of Economic and Fiscal Policy, minister of 
Internal Affairs and Communications, and minister of Economic Trade and 
Industry. Also on the council were four private-sector members appointed 
by the prime minister. The staff of the CEFP was a combination of civil 
servants in the Cabinet Office (the largest number), civil servants seconded 
from other ministries, and private staff who accompanied the private sector 
members of the CEFP. MOF seconded only a few staff and reportedly had 
limited influence via this channel.21 
17. Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, p. 208.
18. Akira Okada, “Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi, Tokumei Tantō Daijin” [Minister in charge of
special assignments, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy], in Chūō Shōchō Kaikaku, Hashimoto 
Kaikakuga Mezashita ‘Kono Kuni No Katachi’ [Central government reform, the kind of government 
Hashimoto wanted to create], Akira Okada and Kazuaki Tanaka, eds. (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron sha, 
2000), p. 126. 
19. Ibid., pp. 125–26.
20. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, August 20, 2009, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/
keizai/index_e.html>. 
21. MOF official, June 24, 2008, interview.
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The CEFP was not only a new player in the budget process, it was also the 
starting point (see Figure 2). Under the pre-reform process, the first major 
step was drafting the budget request guideline outlined above. After the es-
tablishment of the CEFP, it kicked off the budget process by deliberating its 
basic approach to the budget for the coming FY, starting with a review of the 
key numbers such as GDP growth forecast and expected tax revenues. The 
process began as early as April. On the basis of its discussions, the CEFP 
drafted a document called the “Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Policy 
Management and Structural Reform” (hereafter, Basic Policies), setting out 
the basic principles for the coming budget; it was then submitted to the 
cabinet for approval. The cabinet-approved Basic Policies stated the broad 
policy direction of the government and how this should be reflected in the 
upcoming budget. Thus, the CEFP was intended to give the government 
greater control in setting overall fiscal policy—how it would relate to over-
arching macroeconomic policies—and influence over how the budget would 
reflect government priorities. These would be articulated publicly and more 
specifically than in the past.
Although the Basic Policies typically did not include any specific num-





Cabinet approval of budget
Submission to Diet
Diet approval










figure 2. The CEFP and the Budget Process
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they served as the basis for subsequent budget request guidelines and could 
constrain or enable requests for spending.
After the Basic Policies were drafted, the remainder of the budget process 
followed a path very similar to the previous one. One exception was the 
items that the CEFP decided to continue deliberating. Such items typically 
included large spending areas such as social security or public works. CEFP 
deliberations could last through the fall; once outstanding issues were set-
tled, these would be reflected in the budget. Finally, it is important to note 
that the CEFP did not deliberate tax issues.
THE CEFP:  QUESTIONS OF EFFICACY
The creation of the new Cabinet Office and the CEFP within it was in-
tended to strengthen the executive, centralize policymaking, and enhance 
control over the bureaucracy. This section considers whether the CEFP and 
its new role in the budget process in fact produced these changes. 
Did the CEFP strengthen the executive’s role in the budget process and 
alter the balance of power between the key actors? Who called the shots? 
And in cases where there were disagreements, who prevailed? According to 
those touting the reforms, the strengthening of the cabinet and creation of the 
CEFP would prevent fragmented, bottom-up policymaking. Such policies re-
sulted from initiatives making their way up vertically separated bureaus and 
ministries (tatewari gyōsei), and from efforts to shift the policymaking ini-
tiative from the bureaucracy to the cabinet. The reform was intended to 
enhance the power of the executive at the expense of the ruling party, which 
often prevented effective government leadership. This meant the executive 
would use the CEFP to take charge of the budget process while diminishing 
the influence of bureaucrats and ruling party backbenchers. As one LDP 
member involved in the reform, Ishihara Nobuteru, commented, “We need 
a system that allows the prime minister to direct and supervise the most 
important parts of the budget, its basic features, mechanisms, scale and so 
forth.”22
A review of how the new budget process functioned, in particular how it 
shaped the interactions among key actors, is presented below. The discussion 
is organized into sections on individual prime ministers because each had 
different priorities and leadership styles. The following focuses primarily on 
22. Okada, “Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi,” p. 122.
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the early stages of the budget negotiations because this is the part of the 
budget process that changed. The analysis pays particular attention to the 
politics around the drafting and approval of the Basic Policies.
Koizumi Junichirō
Although the CEFP was established during the end of Prime Minister Mori 
Yoshirō’s brief tenure, Prime Minister Koizumi was the first to have the 
CEFP at his disposal for annual budget negotiations, in 2001. In this case, 
assessing the relationship with the ruling party is straightforward because 
Koizumi’s priorities created visible opposition. Koizumi, who had commit-
ted to “destroying” the LDP, wanted to change the entire policymaking pro-
cess, removing the influence of pork-barrel-driven backbenchers. Regarding 
the budget process specifically, the CEFP helped Koizumi pursue his agenda, 
although his leadership was essential to helping him overcome opposition 
from his own party.
Under Koizumi, who oversaw five Basic Policies for the FYs between 2002 
and 2007, the CEFP evolved into an important locus of budget negotiations 
and a body through which the prime minister directed the budget process. 
Chairing the CEFP and staffing it with those sympathetic to his agenda 
largely closed the body to the influence of LDP backbenchers. This allowed 
Koizumi to include proposals that would run against the preferences of 
many within his own party, such as calls to limit budget expenditures, bond 
issuance, and controversial items such as public works. Koizumi included in 
the Basic Policies specific language that would dictate the subsequent draft-
ing of the budget, thus reducing the scope for backroom maneuvering by 
zoku Diet members and bureaucrats. 
The CEFP did not solve all of Koizumi’s political problems: ultimately, it 
was only an advisory board. He still had to contend with opposition from 
his own party, and the Basic Policies required cabinet approval. Koizumi 
faced intense opposition from his own party because of the large cuts that he 
proposed, particularly in social security and public works. The prime minis-
ter did not and could not avoid this opposition, a situation that the CEFP 
ultimately did not change, and he was often forced to make concessions dur-
ing consultations with the LDP. But even with these concessions, the Basic 
Policies heavily reflected Koizumi’s priorities. Koizumi was able to include 
language that called for limiting the growth of budget expenditures and 
bond issues. His hawkish approach to the budget intensified during his time 
AS5005_07_Park.indd   976 10/19/10   10:29 AM
PARK /  JAPAN BUDGET REFORM • 977
in office as the economy began to recover. For the 2006 and 2007 Basic Poli-
cies, Koizumi succeeded in including the controversial phrase that the gov-
ernment would make the maximum possible reductions in expenditures 
(saidaigen no saishutsu sakugen). 
The CEFP also faced opposition initially from MOF, which saw the body 
as encroaching on its budget authority. The critical question was how specific 
the CEFP would make its Basic Policies. MOF wanted to keep the guidelines 
as vague as possible, allowing it greater discretion in later stages of the budget 
process. MOF also viewed the inclusion of special policy priority areas with 
some degree of concern because any mention of them in the Basic Policies 
was seen as empowering the spending ministries during later negotiations. As 
discussed below, this became a significant problem for MOF under subse-
quent leaders far less sympathetic to its goal of limiting budget expenditures. 
MOF argued that the Basic Policies should not include specific numerical 
targets. Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi argued that the outline should be 
broad, and he coined the term “big-boned” policy to refer to the Basic Poli-
cies.23 In practice, the Basic Policies did not include detailed numerical tar-
gets, although they provided specific targets such as not having bond issuances 
or expenditures exceed those of a certain year. One significant exception was 
Koizumi’s final Basic Policies document for FY 2007, which included detailed 
targets as part of his Integrated Revenue and Expenditure Reform (IRER). 
The IRER was an ambitious plan for fiscal consolidation that Koizumi hoped, 
ultimately unsuccessfully, would commit his successors to fiscal discipline.
Although MOF did not like the encroachment of the CEFP, it is difficult 
to assess the degree to which the CEFP influenced relations between Koizumi 
and MOF. This is because Koizumi’s goals—cutting spending and slashing 
public works—largely aligned with those of MOF. Koizumi appointed fiscal 
hawks and reformists to the CEFP, and his hawkish fiscal stance was viewed 
favorably within the ministry.24 Koizumi’s Basic Policies documents helped 
MOF in subsequent budget negotiations to deflect spending requests.
Abe Shinzō
Abe Shinzō was a transitional figure as prime minister, owing his position in 
part to his vow to continue Koizumi’s reforms, but in reality facilitating a 
23. “Big-Boned Policies May Face Uncertain Future,” Daily Yomiuri, June 30, 2005.
24. MOF official, June 27, 2008, interview.
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reconstitution of the old style of policy making. Abe, whose administration 
developed the Basic Policies in 2007 for the FY 2008, invited back some of 
the old-guard rebels that Koizumi had kicked out of the party.25 In terms of 
policy making, Abe never really controlled the agenda of the CEFP, and 
under Abe, the influence of the zoku Diet members and the spending min-
istries returned. It is difficult to determine what exactly Abe’s policy prefer-
ences were since he sounded more or less reformist at different times. He was 
also undoubtedly influenced by the approaching House of Councilors elec-
tion in July 2007, which ultimately led to a large loss of LDP seats, the re-
sults of which were viewed as a reaction to Koizumi’s neo-liberal policies. 
Regardless of Abe’s preferences, though, it is clear that under his administra-
tion the new CEFP did not function as it did under Koizumi.
Under Abe, the zoku and spending ministries exercised greater influence 
on the CEFP agenda and what was ultimately included in the Basic Policies. 
In the Basic Policies, Abe seemed to demonstrate policy initiative by includ-
ing two new areas, education and the environment. In reality, the education 
proposals were a repackaging of ideas supported by the education zoku, and 
the relevant spending ministries had backed the environmental proposals. 
Abe included in the Basic Policies language that committed the government 
to achieving the largest budget expenditure cuts possible, a carryover from 
Koizumi and one unpopular with the party. But LDP backbenchers and 
spending ministries partly circumvented this by having their priorities in-
cluded in the Basic Policies, which would help them make budget claims in 
later negotiations. This situation alarmed Ota Hiroko, minister of state for 
Economic and Fiscal Policy.26 As a result, the section of the Basic Policies 
describing the government’s priorities, i.e., areas that should receive prefer-
ential budget treatment, expanded. On the other hand, the part dealing with 
the specifics of the budget, which Koizumi had used to help restrain spend-
ing, were minimalist and vague.
Fukuda Yasuo
Under Fukuda Yasuo, the regressive trend that began with Abe’s administra-
tion continued. The Basic Policies were highly contested, but the CEFP did 
25. Koizumi expelled members of his own party who opposed the privatization of the postal
system, one of his signature reforms, in 2005.
26. “Honebuto Genan Koutai Minkan Teian, Kage Usuku” [Big-boned policies draft, retreat from
private members’ prosposal, weakening influence], Asahi Shimbun [Asahi News], June 10, 2007. 
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not function as an effective instrument of the executive. This was in part 
because Fukuda did not have a clearly articulated vision like Koizumi. Fukuda 
did not take the lead in setting the CEFP agenda and allowed LDP back-
benchers and spending ministries to influence the process. Both appeared to 
be emboldened after years on the defensive, and at one point, LDP Diet 
members attempted to remove language that had become a pillar of the 
Basic Policies since Koizumi. Specifically, under both Koizumi and Abe, the 
Basic Policies asserted that the government would make the maximum pos-
sible reductions in budget expenditures. Opponents of cuts in the LDP lob-
bied to change the wording to state that the government would make an 
“effort” to carry out the maximum possible reductions. Although initially 
accepted, MOF fought back, and the original language was restored.27 Even 
though Fukuda backed MOF, it was clear that neither he nor the CEFP was 
setting the agenda.
In response to LDP opposition, including some entire sections within the 
party’s Policy Research Council, Fukuda also retreated on specific proposals. 
Specifically, the government revised a draft of the Basic Policies in response 
to LDP pressure to include language giving priority to social security and 
education.28 Other sensitive issues were not settled and were left to be re-
solved at a later date, underscoring the diminished role of the CEFP and the 
role of the Basic Policies in setting the tone for subsequent budget negotia-
tions. One area where Fukuda did clearly take up a new issue against wide-
spread opposition from his own party was the gasoline tax, which has been 
a dedicated source of revenue for road construction. Fukuda included in the 
Basic Policies a provision that would abolish the earmark for road construc-
tion. Still, even this provision was largely a rearguard action in response to 
proposals by the opposition DPJ.
Asō Taro
With Prime Minister Asō, the government’s commitment to fiscal recon-
struction, begun under Koizumi and at least respected in word by Abe and 
Fukuda, was delayed indefinitely, in part because of the global financial 
27. “Kaikaku No Hata, Gyakufu Tsuyoshi ‘Honebuto No Hoshin 08’ Genan” [The reform flag,
the big-boned policies for 2008 face strong resistance], ibid., June 24, 2008. 
28. “Honebuto09 Kakugi Kettei Saishutsu Sakugenhe Hidane Kiezu” [Cabinet decision on the
big-boned policies for 2009, trying to keep alive the momentum for expenditure cuts], ibid., June 28, 
2008. 
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crisis and Japan’s sharp economic deterioration. With the shift to fiscal 
stimulus, many of the tensions between the government and the ruling 
party disappeared, although the effort exacerbated tensions with fiscal 
hawks, in particular MOF. Even though the goals of the Asō cabinet and 
LDP backbenchers converged with fiscal stimulus, the ruling party reclaimed 
its role in the budget process. With pressure from the LDP and little resis-
tance from Prime Minister Asō, the government dispensed with many of the 
targets that had been set for trimming expenditure growth, including social 
security. The LDP also succeeded in removing key language urging fiscal 
restraint, and the phrase “limiting budget expenditures to the maximum 
extent possible” was removed entirely. Moreover, for the 2010 FY budget, the 
sections in the Basic Policies that described the budget policy, which under 
Koizumi were quite specific, were spare, leaving much wider scope for future 
negotiations. Regarding the role of MOF, it is fairly clear that the govern-
ment (and party) called the shots. This, however, had little to do with the 
CEFP and new budget process, but rather represents a general trend from 
the 1990s.29 
General Trends
The foregoing discussion demonstrates a number of general points about 
how the creation of the CEFP and the new budget process shaped the poli-
tics of budget spending. First, it is clear that drafting the Basic Policies be-
came a highly contested part of budget negotiations. All of the key actors 
viewed the Basic Policies as a new and significant stage in the overall budget 
process, and consequently exerted considerable effort to shape the outcome. 
The wording of the document, whether numerical targets would be included 
(they were typically not), and how extensive the instructions would be re-
garding the future budget were all disputed. In this sense, the reform 
changed the budget process, moving up the calendar and opening up new 
avenues of influence. Depending on who was prime minister, however, influ-
ence ran both ways. The CEFP functioned only as an advisory council, and 
ultimately, its recommendations had to be approved by the cabinet. Whether 
a prime minister could craft controversial Basic Policies and win cabinet ap-
proval depended on his leadership; the CEFP did little to enhance the power 
of the executive headed by a passive or weak leader. 
29. Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle.
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Koizumi is the exception that proves the rule. While Koizumi wielded the 
CEFP quite effectively to influence budget negotiations, he could do so be-
cause of his popularity with the electorate, which was enhanced by his image 
as a reformer. Although the CEFP was a useful instrument, Koizumi’s leader-
ship was a necessary factor that allowed him to pass his budgets. After Koi-
zumi, under the weaker leadership of subsequent prime ministers, the 
executive played less of a leading role in the budget making process. Spend-
ing ministries, zoku Diet members, and the leadership of the LDP flexed 
their influence muscles during the formulation of the Basic Policies, with the 
CEFP playing less and less of an independent role. One manifestation of the 
declining influence of the CEFP was the declining specificity of the Basic 
Policies. Under Koizumi, the Basic Policies contained much more detailed 
guidelines for drafting the budget. After Koizumi, the section on the budget 
















figure 3. Length of Section on Budget in the Basic Policies for the Coming Fiscal
Year Budget 
source: Cabinet Office, Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management [Kongo no keizai zaisei oyobi 
keizaishakai no kouzou ni kansuru kihon houshin ni tsuite], 2002–10, <www.cao.go.jp>, accessed August 
20, 2009.
note: 2007 data include pages from the Appendix, which is part of Koizumi’s IRER fiscal consolidation 
plan. It includes very detailed guidelines for the budget.
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The relationship among the executive, the LDP, spending ministries, and 
MOF changed, but only slightly. MOF still drafted the budget request 
guidelines, but it had to follow the new Basic Policies when it did so. The 
budget guideline itself was the product of government, LDP, and MOF ne-
gotiations, similar to the old process. One difference, however, was that the 
new budget process made it easier in some cases for the spending ministries 
and LDP backbenchers to tie the hands of MOF at an earlier stage by having 
their programs or initiatives included as priorities in the Basic Policies. In 
this regard, the new approach made it more difficult for MOF to control the 
budget process.30
The CEFP did improve transparency. The deliberations of the CEFP were 
published on the Web. Thus, the negotiations and contending viewpoints 
were public, whereas in the past, negotiations took place largely behind the 
closed doors of the LDP. Any revision or deviation from the CEFP proposals 
were thus exposed to public scrutiny. This change appeared to have affected 
the media coverage of the budget process. For instance, in cases where pro-
posals of reformist or fiscally conservative private members of the CEFP 
were ignored, newspapers widely criticized the LDP for backtracking. 
Assessing the impact of the CEFP on Japan’s fiscal performance is diffi-
cult. There have been a number of extraordinary events since the 1990s, in-
cluding a series of domestic economic recessions, Japan’s banking crisis, the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the collapse of the dot.com bubble, the terrorist at-
tacks on 9/11, and the global financial meltdown of 2008. Thus, any trends 
in the data should be considered tentative and at this point impressionistic. 
Figure 4 shows the change in the budget request guideline total from the 
previous year. Koizumi succeeded in keeping the ceiling growth low or re-
ducing it. Under Abe (FY 2008) and Fukuda (FY 2009), the ceiling increased 
slightly. In the case of Asō (FY 2010), the ceiling increased sharply, which is 
understandable given Japan’s rapid economic slowdown with the onset of the 
global financial crisis. Considering the impact of the financial crisis in 2008, 
which shaped the FY 2009 budget request guideline, the overall picture is 
one of relative spending constraint. This picture draws further support from 
the fact that the ceilings actually held all the way through the budget pro-
cess, aside from the budget for FY 2009 and FY 2010. During the later stages 
of drafting the 2009 budget, the onset of the global financial crisis became 
30. MOF official, June 27, 2008, interview.
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clear, and the initial ceiling was abandoned. It should be noted, as discussed 
earlier, that even prior to creation of the CEFP, budget ceilings were largely 
observed for the remainder of the budget process. 
One cannot draw the conclusion from the previous data that the CEFP 
enhanced the government’s ability to limit budget growth, for several rea-
sons. Most important, the budget request guideline only covers a share of 
total budget spending, about 60%. The budget request guideline excludes 
debt servicing costs and the Local Allocation Tax, which is distributed to 
local governments by formula. Both are treated as fixed expenditures. Ad-
ditionally, the actual budget submitted to and passed by the Diet can be al-
tered mid-year through the passage of supplementary budgets. Thus, any 
restraint imposed during the budget negotiations can be overridden during 
the execution of the budget, with Diet approval. In practice, supplementary 
budgets are passed, in some cases multiple times, virtually every FY. These 
increases can be quite large, as in the late 1990s, when they exceeded 8% of 
the initial budget (see Figure 5, which shows the extent to which supplemen-
tary budgets increased budget expenditures from the initial budget). 
The CEFP played no significant role in determining the amount of sup-
plementary budgets, which have been widely criticized as being arrived at by 
–4.0%









figure 4. Budget Request Guideline, Change from Previous Fiscal Year
source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, Basic Request Guideline [Ippan saishutsu no gaisan youkyuu 
kijun no kangekata], 2003–10, <www.mof.go.jp>, accessed August 20, 2009.
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political considerations.31 Thus, the Basic Policies, which is one of the distin-
guishing features of the new budget process, failed to exert much influence 
over a significant share of budget expenditures. Moreover, the CEFP’s Basic 
Policies did not specify in any meaningful way how Japan’s second budget, 
the FILP Plan, should be drafted.
BUDGET REFORM DPJ-STYLE
Since coming to power in September 2009, the new DPJ government, as 
pledged during its election campaign, has embarked on a second overhaul of 
Japan’s budget institutions. The new government established the Govern-
ment Revitalization Unit (GRU) to vet specific budget requests. It also es-
tablished the much-anticipated National Policy Unit, which effectively 
superseded the now defunct CEFP, to guide economic and fiscal policy. 
Although not much time has passed since the creation of Japan’s budget 
institutions, they have already played a role in helping the new government 
control the budget process. Both the Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto admin-
istrations have taken a much more hands-on approach to spending decisions. 
31. MOF official, June 24, 2008, interview.
figure 5. Change from Initial to Final Budget
source: Japanese MOF, Expenditures and Revenue from the Start of Meiji [Meiji shonen ikou ippan 
kaikei sainyuu saishutsu gaisan], 1990–2008, <www.mof.go.jp>, accessed August 20, 2009.
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Thus far the GRU, rather than the National Policy Unit (NPU), has had the 
highest-visibility impact on changing the budget process. The Hatoyama cabi-
net created the GRU in September 2009 to review government projects, mak-
ing decisions on whether or not they should be reduced or abolished. The 
prime minister is the chair of the GRU; the state minister of government revi-
talization, a cabinet appointment without portfolio, is the vice chair. The 
prime minister also names several outside members. The staff of the GRU is 
composed primarily of bureaucrats from various ministries. 
In a series of meetings, which were publicly broadcast on the Web, the 
GRU reviewed specific spending proposals. The Hatoyama administration’s 
decision to make the proceedings of the GRU open to the public has been 
highly significant. First, the move has been very popular with both the media 
and public. Second, the increased transparency has closed off the back-door 
channels that lobbyists, party backbenchers, and spending ministries used in 
the past to influence the budget. Consequently, the GRU has helped the 
government push through spending cuts that would have been more diffi-
cult, if not impossible, under the old budget process. While the CEFP also 
increased transparency, the GRU has gone much further. The CEFP pub-
lished its proceedings, but budget proceedings were limited to discussion 
over general policy direction. In the case of GRU, the public proceedings 
covered deliberation over specific spending items, discussions that directly 
impacted specific political and bureaucratic interests.
The new budget process has also empowered MOF. Rather than view 
GRU as a competitor, MOF has attempted to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity it has provided. MOF has seconded three of its staff to GRU, all fiscal 
hawks with experience in the ministry’s Budget Bureau. The bureau has also 
played a key supporting role, providing the technical expertise to review 
government projects. MOF has been very happy with this arrangement be-
cause GRU and the new DPJ administrations have provided the backing to 
make politically difficult reductions.32 Other parties, however, have been less 
enthusiastic about the new process. Spending ministries have been thrown 
into a defensive position, and there is a perception that the new process has 
actually given too much influence to MOF.33 The cuts also engendered a 
political backlash from localities that will lose public works projects.
32. Author interview with MOF official, Tokyo, December 11, 2009.
33. Author interview with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry official, Tokyo, December
11, 2009. 
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The DPJ administrations have also provided better political insulation for 
MOF. The Hatoyama administration banned lobbyists and local government 
officials from directly appealing to MOF, a practice common under the old 
budget process. Previously, each December the halls were busy with ministry 
officials meeting with local government officials, LDP politicians, and lobby-
ists. Under the DPJ, the MOF building has become relatively quiet. Under 
Prime Minister Hatoyama, lobbying was required to go directly through the 
DPJ headquarters, specifically party General Secretary Ozawa Ichirō and the 
vice general secretary, who then conveyed information to the cabinet. Al-
though the party and cabinet have taken a hawkish stance toward public 
works spending, the arrangement raised the question of how the relationship 
between the two will evolve. Ozawa had no formal cabinet role, but he is one 
of the most influential members of the party. He is an elections expert who 
helped mastermind the DPJ’s political landslide that brought it to power, and 
many newly elected DPJ Diet members owe their success to him. His recent 
resignation, and the appointment to Prime Minister Kan Naoto’s cabinet of 
members critical of Ozawa, seemed to suggest that his influence waned. 
Ozawa also lost a bid to unseat Kan as president of the LDP, and by extension 
prime minister, in September 2010, although the results show that he has 
strong support among other DPJ Diet members. Ozawa no longer acts as the 
key interface between the party and lobbyists. Instead, the DPJ has revived its 
Policy Research Council (PRC) to play this role.
The NPU focuses on broader fiscal issues. The national policy minister, 
senior vice minister for the economy, and Cabinet Office economy secretary 
occupy the key leadership positions. As of June 2009, the NPU staff in-
cluded 18 bureaucrats and 13 members seconded from the private sector. The 
NPU, as with the CEFP, sets overall direction of economic and fiscal policy. 
Additionally, the NPU, as with the CEFP, discusses specific issues such as 
further reform of the budget process, the absorption of Japan’s government 
bonds, pension reform, the tax system, etc. 
Because the DPJ took power in the middle of the budget process for FY 
2010, the NPU did not have time to have a decisive role in shaping the bud-
get, which led to some media criticism of the NPU’s effectiveness. Still, the 
DPJ attempted to use the NPU to take a more-complete view of budget 
spending. Whereas the CEFP’s role was weakened by its inability to control 
supplementary budgets, the FILP, and other sources of spending, the NPU 
approached spending comprehensively. The NPU also proposed moving to 
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a three-year budget, which would constrain the government’s use of politi-
cally motivated supplementary budgets, and the NPU as well as the GRU 
have begun to look more closely at Japan’s special accounts. The NPU also 
started to build capacity to monitor the execution of the budget throughout 
the course of the FY, a significant departure from the CEFP.
Initially, the NPU as well as the GRU were created as provisional bodies. 
Hatoyama intended to upgrade the NPU to a formal government bureau, 
the National Policy Bureau (NPB), with greater authority over the budget. 
Because the GRU proved to be popular, Hatoyama decided to make it per-
manent as well. These measures were to be included in a bill to enhance the 
political leadership (seiji shudō kakuritu an). After Hatoyama’s resignation in 
June 2010, Prime Minister Kan did not have time to pass the bill prior to 
upper house elections in July 2010. The election produced a large loss for the 
DPJ, which had held only the most tenuous control over the upper house. 
Unable to form a coalition large enough to pass legislation in the upper 
house, the DPJ lost the ability to pass legislation that would upgrade the 
NPU and make the GRU permanent. Consequently, Kan has downgraded 
the NPU, opening up the question once again of who will take the lead in 
the budget process.
Still, the NPU and GRU reflect the DPJ’s preferences for greater transpar-
ency, centralization, and control over the execution of the budget. Thus far, 
both bodies have the potential to help the government gain greater control 
over the budget, including in areas neglected by the CEFP, although the 
future of both is now uncertain. The different approach of the DPJ to bud-
get reform, however, is a reminder that while budget institutions can have an 
independent causal effect, such institutions are also endogenous, reflecting 
the preferences of the government in power. Many of the changes in the 
budget process under the Hatoyama and Kan cabinets are primarily the re-
sult of the different priorities of the new party in power, not institutions.
Thus far, the government has effectively created and wielded budget insti-
tutions to significant effect, but the question remains whether or not these 
institutions will be durable. Hypothetically, if the LDP or some other coali-
tion comes to power, a new government could change Japan’s budget institu-
tions yet again. These new institutions could in turn reflect the new 
government’s preferences. The failure of the DPJ to pass legislation making 
the new budget institutions permanent will make it much easier for future 
administrations to abandon the NPU and GRU. That said, there is likely to 
AS5005_07_Park.indd   987 10/19/10   10:29 AM
988  • ASIAN SURvEY 50:5
be some lock-in effect. Any administration would likely face public criticism 
if attempts were made to undo the reforms. Increased transparency, in par-
ticular, has been highly popular, and efforts to reduce transparency are likely 
to carry real political costs.
If the DPJ can better institutionalize its new budget process, the budget-
ing game will be significantly different. Already, the executive is playing a 
more direct role in the budget from start to finish. Such centralization and 
increased transparency are likely to increase incentives for the government to 
take responsibility for its budget choices and give it enhanced control over 
the process. 
CONCLUSION
From the previous discussion, it is clear that both the LDP’s and DPJ’s bud-
get reforms have been consequential, although in what way varies greatly. 
The CEFP gave the executive a new forum for formulating budget policy, 
one that in principle would allow it to work in greater isolation from bureau-
cratic and party backbencher pressure. But in practice, while the new CEFP 
drafted the Basic Policies, its degree of autonomy from the ruling party and 
bureaucracy depended largely on the leadership of the prime minister, his 
willingness to use the body, and the political standing needed to overcome 
internal party opposition. While Prime Minister Koizumi effectively used 
the CEFP, subsequent prime ministers used a more decentralized process of 
drafting the Basic Policies that differed only a little from the pre-reform 
process. Moreover, the CEFP exerted much less influence over the later 
stages of the budget drafting process and its execution. 
Although the DPJ’s budget reforms are still a work in progress, they may 
go further in centralizing budget-making authority in the executive. Like the 
CEFP, the NPU set overarching budget policy. Although its future is now 
uncertain, the DPJ is still clearly committed to assert greater executive con-
trol over the budget process from drafting to execution, an important 
departure from the CEFP. The GRU allows the government to vet micro-
level spending choices that had been largely left to bureaucrats and zoku 
politicians. Forbidding lobbying directly to spending ministries and back-
benchers also has reduced their influence.
The question remains whether the DPJ’s budget reform will help the Japa-
nese government better cover the costs of their spending decisions and 
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maintain greater fiscal discipline in the future. Ceteris paribus, the answer 
appears to be yes. The government now has better mechanisms to control 
spending throughout the process. But budget institutions are only one factor 
influencing fiscal outcomes. While the DPJ has taken measures to strengthen 
Japan’s budget-making institutions, its domestic campaign platform prom-
ised large spending increases while offering only vague commitments to in-
crease revenue. With Japan’s fiscal situation deteriorating, the DPJ has 
embraced a new fiscal consolidation agenda. With budget institutions that 
will help the executive set budget allocation priorities, vet micro-level spend-
ing decisions, and control more firmly the entire budget throughout its 
drafting and execution, the government will have a greater ability to imple-
ment its choices. It remains to be seen, however, how durable Japan’s new 
emerging budget institutions will be. 
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